Special Warfare

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VOLUME 21 ISSUE 5

INTO AFRICA:

Civil Affairs Team focuses on civil miltary engagements

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DEPARTMENTS

ON THE COVER
A Civil Affairs team travels through Chad as part of a growing mission of civil-military engagements on the African continent. *Photo copyright C. Brian McCartney, used with permission.*



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For more than 50 years, the JFK Special Warfare Center and School has been training the Soldiers at the tip of the spear. Over the past seven years, our instruction in counterinsurgency has been honed and refined by operations on the battlefields of Afghanistan, Iraq and other places, such as the Philippines and Colombia.

The lessons we take from those operations are put into practice here at the Army's premier training center, not only to train new Soldiers to fill the force, but also to improve the skills of the men and women already filling the force. These Soldiers carry an enormous responsibility. Their missions are demanding and require a high degree of professionalism, and yet they succeed, day after day, on battlefield after battlefield. They are why we are here. They are the reason we continually seek to improve our training, to learn more about insurgency and to improve our understanding of this ancient form of conflict.

Our special-operations Soldiers have many weapons at their disposal, but perhaps the most important is their diplomacy and their ability establish trust and win friends in villages and towns in remote corners of the world.

In this issue of *Special Warfare*, Major Danford Bryant discusses an increasingly nonlethal approach to insurgency and says that Civil Affairs Soldiers can be at the center of that approach. His article details how elements of the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion deployed to Chad last year to support operations in the Trans-Sahel region. There, they not only supported the operations of other special-operations forces, or SOF, but also traveled to remote regions to conduct operations of their own. Their work in those remote areas established trust and opened doors for subsequent SOF operations, and the good will they established will provide beneficial effects for some time to come.

Major Bryant's article gives us a good example of the importance of Civil Affairs Soldiers and reminds us that CA must be a part of all ARSOF planning and must be active in our operations. But as Major Bryant points out, as a civil-military support element, CA forces are not acting solely as a "slice" element sent in to support other SOF but may often serve as the main effort in achieving the desired long-term effects. In that capacity, CA Soldiers must also be capable of operating on their own, with minimal guidance, and with an appreciation of the cultural and political situation in which they are immersed. Recent changes to the Civil Affairs training pipeline at the Special Warfare Center and School have been designed to give Soldiers additional training in cultural awareness and adaptive thinking, and we are continuing to modify the pipeline.

In another article, retired Lieutenant Colonels Walter Perry and John Gordon IV examine the way that intelligence contributes to counterinsurgency, or COIN. The authors examine the unique role of intelligence in COIN and discuss analytic tools and methods that can provide useful information for COIN planning and operations.

What our force learns in the field is only one aspect of its education. Advanced schooling at both the officer and NCO levels helps Soldiers see situations analytically. One such program is the Special Operations Master's Degree Program, or SOMDP, available at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, Calif. Since 1992, SOMDP has trained officers to be the critical thinkers and capable operators that are essential in SOF staff and leadership positions. As a sign of the importance of SOMDP graduates, the U.S. Army Special Operations Command has recently increased its quota of NPS slots. The article in this issue by Colonel Brian Greenshields and retired Colonel Pete Gustaitis describes the program's origins and content, and I urge all eligible officers to learn more about the program and to apply.

As operations take a more indirect and nonlethal approach, the role of ARSOF will probably increase. The ongoing growth in the size of our Special Forces groups and our CA brigades is designed to handle the demand. At SWCS, we will continue to modify our training and doctrine by adapting them to incorporate lessons from the battlefield. It is our mission to make sure the tip of the spear remains sharp.



Major General Thomas R. Csrnko

160th SOAR aviator receives Distinguished Service Cross

During a ceremony on July 11 at Fort Campbell, Ky., Chief Warrant Officer 5 David F. Cooper, 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, became the first Night Stalker in the unit's history, and the only living aviator, to receive the Distinguished Service Cross in support of the war on terror.

"We stand here today in awe of Mr. Cooper," said Admiral Eric T. Olson, commander, U.S. Special Operations Command, who presented the medal. "His actions read like adventure fiction, but they are real. Others live because of his selfless courage."

Cooper led an AH-6 Little Bird flight on a mission against a foreign fighter facilitator in central Iraq on Nov. 27, 2006. While moving between waiting locations on this mission, his wingman was shot down by enemy fire. The helicopter-assault force immediately landed and, along with the special-operations ground forces on board, set up a small perimeter around the crashed aircraft. Although there were no serious injuries, the aircraft was not flyable.

After confirming that there was no immediate threat to the assault-force position, the two Black Hawk helicopters of the formation, carrying the pilots from the downed aircraft, returned to their base to get a downed-aircraft recovery team.

That left the force of about 20 special-operations forces at the crash site with one mission-capable AH-6 and two MH-6 helicopters. The crash site was flat desert ground, leaving the troops without cover while they defended the area.

About 40 minutes after the crash, enemy personnel suddenly appeared and began firing on their position. Cooper and his co-pilot were already starting up their engines to get an aerial view of the situation. Immediately upon taking off, Cooper's aircraft became the target for enemy fire. Cooper flew his helicopter directly into the enemy fire, attacking the enemy positions and diverting fire away from the ground forces.

^ **RECEIVING HONORS** Admiral Eric T. Olson, commander, U.S. Special Operations Command, pins the Distinguished Service Cross on Chief Warrant Officer 5 David F. Cooper, 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, during a ceremony July 11 at Fort Campbell, Ky. Colonel Clayton M. Hutmacher, the 160th commander, assists. *160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment PAO.*

He landed his helicopter near the crash site twice during the engagement, where his fellow pilots downloaded ammunition and fuel from the crashed Little Bird and transferred it to his. These actions kept Cooper's aircraft in the fight for as along as possible. After a third series of aerial gunnery attacks, the enemy personnel finally ceased firing and fled the area.

Lieutenant General Robert W. Wagner, commander of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, described Cooper's actions that day as seemingly impossible.

"Imagine what would have happened had (Cooper) not defied all odds and heroically flown into a heavily armed gauntlet attracting fire to himself in order to divert deadly enemy fire from his teammates and then, most courageous and heroically, rearming and refueling on-site to continue the fight," he said. "Unbelievable courage, brilliant presence of mind, selfless saving acts under the most demanding combat conditions — (he is) a true hero in every sense of the word."

"Operating most often as members of an aircraft joint team, you are the ideal teammates," Wagner said. "Many of your casualties have been suffered after making the conscious and deliberate decision to fly into a hot landing zone to save troops on the ground who have no other hope. To this unit, the loyalty of the ground and maritime forces ... is deep and forever." — *160th SOAR PAO.*

3rd SF Group welcomes new commander

Colonel Gus Benton II took the reins of the 3rd Special Forces Group from Colonel Christopher K. Haas during a change-of-command ceremony July 10 on Fort Bragg's Meadows Field.

After having served with the 3rd SF Group for two years and two combat tours to Afghanistan, Haas passed command of the group to Benton in front of the group, its families and several distinguished guests.

Benton, who received his degree from Fort Valley State University as an ROTC distinguished military graduate, comes to the group from being the chief of staff for the U.S. Army Special Forces Command. Prior to that, he was the commander of the 2nd Battalion, 3rd SF Group which he led through two combat tours in Afghanistan.

"It is a great pleasure to pass the group colors to Colonel Gus Benton," said Brigadier General Michael S. Repass, commanding general, U.S. Army Special Forces Command, who spoke at the ceremony.

Benton said it was good to be back in the 3rd SF Group, and that he plans to lead by example.

"To the Soldiers and families of the 3rd Special Forces Group, I will serve with and lead you with all that God puts in me, of mind, body and soul," said Benton, as he addressed the troops after the passing of the colors, which symbolizes the initiation of his command.

Benton's career in the Army began as a Signal officer. He served in that branch for several years before joining the Special Forces community in 1993. Over the past 15 years, he and his wife, Carmel, and their son, Corey, have enjoyed a successful career.

"First and foremost, where would I be without God, as I'm eternally grateful for his many blessings," Benton said, as he addressed the troops as their commander.

Benton also thanked Major General Thomas R. Csrnko, commanding general of the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, as well as Repass, for their trust and confidence in placing him in command of such a highly decorated and formidable unit.

^ **COMMAND PERFORMANCE** Colonel Gus Benton II assumed command of the 3rd Special Forces Group from Colonel Christopher K. Haas on July 10. *U.S. Army photo.*

For his part, Haas' remarks were heartfelt and personal. He spoke of the achievements of the group under his command and recognized those fallen warriors who have given their lives in service over the years.

"I will carry the memory of the fallen of this group with me for the rest of my life," said Haas.

"All gave the last full measure of devotion, and I will do all I can to honor their sacrifice."

He went on to note the achievements of the group, including the 13 Silver Star Medals, the numerous Bronze Star Medals, Purple Hearts and many other awards.

"The rich history of 3rd Group is a direct reflection of their heroism," Haas said, regarding those who have earned and been awarded these medals.

While Haas gave all accolades to the men in the group, Repass looked to him, as their commander and gave praise.

"Chris, your leadership over the past 25 months has been nothing short of outstanding," Repass said. "As I look at the totality of where you've been and what you've done over the past seven years, I know of no other senior leader in Special Forces that has spent as much time in combat as you."

Repass continued by noting that Benton was inheriting a remarkable force in the 3rd SF Group.

"In Afghanistan, you and your Soldiers served up equal parts of tenacity, lead and steel, compassion and professionalism," Repass said.

He went on to mention the achievements of the group's Soldiers in Iraq, where they have an independent Iraqi counterterrorist force.

"That force is the pre-eminent Iraqi Army unit and probably the best Middle Eastern counterterrorism force," Repass said. — *USASOC PAO.*

Binford takes command of 1st SF Group

Hundreds of Green Berets and support Soldiers from the 1st Special Forces Group assembled in formation at Watkins Field, Fort Lewis, Wash., July 16 as two veteran Special Forces officers conducted the group's change-of-command ceremony.

Colonel Randolph R. Binford accepted command of the group from Colonel Eric P. Wendt during the ceremony.

Binford, a native of Texas, comes to the 1st SF Group after serving at the Pentagon in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence since July 2007. Binford was previously a battalion commander in 3rd SF Group.

Wendt has served multiple previous tours in the 1st SF Group, and commanded the group since 2006 as 1st SF Group troops deployed to Iraq, Afghanistan, the Philippines and numerous other countries throughout the Pacific.

In keeping with Army tradition, Wendt handed the group colors and their symbolic responsibility for the unit's Soldiers to Brigadier General Michael S. Repass, commanding general of the U.S. Army Special Forces Command. With a few private words of encouragement, the general then passed the colors to Binford, who ceremonially passed them back to the group Command Sergeant Major Jeffrey Stigall.

During his remarks at the ceremony, Wendt thanked the group's Soldiers for their accomplishments during his command.

"I want to thank each and every one of you standing in formation, as well as those from previous generations of the 1st Group, because without you, none of the things this group has accomplished would have occurred," Wendt said.

"I am proud to have been of service to our great country as a member of your ranks."

Binford lauded the men and women of 1st SF Group and stated how eager he is to take the reins of the unit.

^ **PASSING THE GUIDON** Brigadier General Michael Repass passes the guidon to Colonel Randolph R. Bindford during the change-of-command ceremony for the 1st SF Group on July 16 at Fort Lewis, Wash. Binford replaces Colonel Eric P. Wendt as commander of the group. *U.S. Army photo.*

"I know you will do great things, and I'm ready to be a part of this great organization," Binford said.

Binford's previous assignments include the Pentagon and multiple tours with the 5th SF Group. Binford also served in Afghanistan and Iraq with the 3rd SF Group.

Binford graduated from Sam Houston State University in 1984 with a bachelor's in sociology and in 1999 graduated from the Naval War College with a master's in national security and strategic studies.

In his next assignment, Wendt will deploy to Iraq again with Multi National Corps-Iraq.

The 1st SF Group, formed in 1957, traces its lineage from Detachment 101 of the Office of Strategic Services, as well as the 1st Special Service Force, a combined World War II U.S. and Canadian unit known as the "Devil's Brigade."

The group has called Fort Lewis home since 1984 and has its headquarters and three battalions. One other battalion is forward-stationed at Torii Station, Okinawa. — *USASOC PAO.*

Fallen SF Soldier receives posthumous Silver Star Medal

The family of a 3rd Special Forces Group Soldier received his posthumous Silver Star Medal during a ceremony at Fort Bragg, N.C., July 14.

Members of Company B, 2nd Battalion, 3rd SF Group, honored their fallen comrade, memorialized his memory and thanked his wife for her sacrifice.

Sergeant 1st Class Justin S. Monschke, an SF weapons sergeant, was killed in action Oct, 14, 2007, just days before his 29th birthday. He was killed by an improvised explosive device during a dismounted movement to a suspected enemy position in the south Baghdad region of Arab Jabour, Iraq.

Prior to his death, Monschke distinguished himself on the field of battle by killing 10 enemy combatants and saving the lives of his fellow Soldiers, as well as the lives of the Iraqi soldiers with them, during an Aug. 1, 2007, battle.

"This is an incredible award, given only to those who have displayed the highest degree of gallantry in service and honor," said Lieutenant General Robert W. Wagner, commanding general, U.S. Army Special Operations Command, who spoke at the award ceremony.

Monschke was serving as the point man during the Aug. 1, 2007, operation with the Iraqi Counterterrorism Force. When the assault force, led by Monschke, received small-arms fire from four terrorists, he immediately returned fire, aggressively charged forward and closed the distance killing three terrorists and wounding a fourth by accurately firing while on the move. Monschke rallied the ICTF element with him to assault the target building. As his group entered the building, they were fired upon, and Monschke returned fire, killing two more terrorists.

Monschke then led the assault force of Iraqis into the fourth target building. As the assault force was entering the building, a vehicle stopped just short of them. Two terrorists exited the vehicle and began firing on the Iraqi assault force, which was outside without cover. Through the open doorway, Monschke killed the two terrorists and their driver, who was also attempting to shoot at them.

A second vehicle, containing four terrorists with weapons poised to kill, approached their position. Monschke again fired his M-249 Squad Automatic Weapon, effectively stopping the vehicle and killing all four terrorists before they were able to harm any of his team.

"When I see these awards, I look at how many times did a person make conscious acts of valor, to influence the situation, when somebody else might not have done that and might not have been able to figure out what to do," said Wagner, who noted Monschke's continued, unhesitating response to the repeated enemy assaults.

Brigadier General Michael S. Repass, commanding general, U.S. Army Special Forces Command, spoke of Monschke's selfless acts of courage.

"Our exploits as Special Forces operators are rarely known to the public, and somewhat tragically, I would say, it's relatively unknown to our own families," Repass said. "It's only on occasions like this that the curtain is pulled back, and the bright light is shined on our operators, what they have done and what they mean to other people. It's perhaps the downside of being a quiet professional, but we have shined the light, none the less on a great operator."

"I think we can all find a great degree of satisfaction knowing that Justin knew he was going to receive this award," said Wagner about Monschke's knowledge regarding his potential Silver Star Medal.

"It's reassuring to know that he knew that." — *USASOC PAO.*

^ **PAYING TRIBUTE** Lieutenant General Robert W. Wagner, commanding general, U.S. Army Special Operations Command, presents a posthumous Silver Star Medal to the family of Sergeant First Class Justin S. Monschke, 3rd SF Group. *U.S. Army photo.*

1st SF Group awards Silver Star Medals

Members of the 1st Special Forces Group, Fort Lewis, Wash., gathered July 16 for the awarding of Silver Star Medals to two Soldiers, honoring each for bravery during Operation Iraqi Freedom last year.

Sergeant 1st Class Chad M. Kite and Staff Sergeant Christopher L. Federmann were presented the medals by Lieutenant General Robert W. Wagner, commanding general of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, and Brgadier General Michael S. Repass, commanding general of the U.S. Special Forces Command. Kite and Federmann were both awarded the nation's third highest medal for valor for their part of an operation to capture a suspected terrorist leader in the city of Ad Diwaniyah, Iraq, on June 3, 2007.

^ **SHINING STARS** Lieutenant General Robert Wagner, commander, United States Army Special Operations Command pins a Silver Star Medal on Sergeant First Class Chad M. Kite during an award's ceremony on July 16 at Fort Lewis, Wash. Also honored was Staff Sergeant Christopher L. Federmann, who was also awarded the Silver Star Medal. *U.S. Army photo.*

Both were part of the primary assault force, consisting of 17 soldiers — a mixture of U.S., coalition and Iraqi soldiers. A second assault force, consisting of nearly 30 U.S. and coalition soldiers, was staged in another part of the city waiting as the quick-reaction force.

The assault force came under heavy enemy sniper fire from multiple directions.

"As it unfolded, it was chaotic," said Kite. "We were surrounded."

Kite and Federmann, along with two other coalition soldiers, moved 100 meters under hostile fire. Kite suppressed the enemy, while Federmann threw multiple hand grenades, neutralizing the enemy threat. They called the second assault force forward to their location and immediately began taking fire.

Despite multiple attempts to neutralize the enemy, the threat could not be eliminated, so Kite and Federmann again moved under heavy enemy fire to engage the enemy.

Kite fired at the enemy, enabling Federmann to fire multiple high explosive rounds from his M-79 grenade launcher. Federmann then launched a smoke grenade onto the rooftop, marking the building for coalition helicopters to place precise machine-gun fire into the building, destroying the remaining enemy presence.

After moving back to the assault force, Kite and Federmann recognized that insurgent forces had moved again and taken positions on the rooftop of a building less than 15 meters away. The surrounding insurgent forces moved to close the distance with the coalition forces. Realizing the deadly threat developing, Kite suppressed the rooftops and intersection, while Federman fired his M-4 carbine and threw multiple grenades at both locations, again neutralizing the threat.

The force later was able to pull out of the enemy stronghold. Under heavy fire, the assault force withdrew from the area, returning fire from the sides of their vehicles. During withdrawal from the target area, Federmann was wounded in the arm from a bullet fragment.

"Sergeants Kite and Federmann displayed exceptional teamwork and uncommon valor over the course of a four-hour engagement, while outnumbered by enemy insurgents," said Colonel Eric P. Wendt, the former 1st SF Group commander.

"Their actions define the spirit of the Silver Star."

Even though both men were in a 360-degree fight, they say the number-one priority for them was making sure everyone made it home.

"We disrupted the terrorists on their turf," Federmann explained. "Everyone did what they were supposed to do to make it out alive — that's the best part." — *USASOC PAO.*

Warmack to lead 95th CA Brigade

Colonel Ferdinand Irizzary II passed command of the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade to Colonel Michael J. Warmack during a change-of-command ceremony at Meadows Memorial Field Aug. 1. The 95th CA Brigade is the Army's only active-duty Civil Affairs unit.

"Ferd, you've done an absolutely brilliant job," said Lieutenant General Robert W. Wagner, commanding general, U.S. Army Special Operations Command. "I think when you look at Ferd, you see a guy who has energy, enthusiasm, knowledge and a bright mind. He never slows down, and he always has another good idea. He thinks out of the box, makes things happen, and enjoys it each and every day."

Irizzary became the first commander of the 95th CA Brigade in 2006, when the unit was re-designated from the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion.

"The last two years have been a period of extraordinary growth, turbulence and operational tempo," Irizzary said. "It has also been a period of fantastic accomplishments."

Since 2006, the brigade has added a headquarters and three new battalions, he said. It has doubled in personnel, had a 10-fold increase in facilities, tripled its budget and quadrupled the number of missions.

"Through all of this, two things have remained consistent: the tremendous devotion to duty for the Soldiers and their families, and the command climate," he said. "The Soldiers represent the point of the spear for our nation's foreign policy. They take the risk and put their talents on the line in the name of our great nation every day. They have the discipline and skills to destroy an unconventional enemy or nurture a struggling ally."

"It's a proud day for all of you for what you've accomplished," Wagner said, "which is far more than we could ever order you to do. You've gone far beyond anyone's expectations, and I know you'll continue to do that. I would like to welcome your new commander, Colonel Mike Warmack, who is no stranger to the community and is extraordinarily well-qualified for this."

^ **IN COMMAND** Lieutenant General Robert W. Wagner, commanding general, U.S. Army Special Operations Command, passes the 95th Civil Affairs Guidon to Colonel Michal J. Warmack. Warmack took command of the unit from Colonel Ferdinand Irizzary II. *U.S. Army photo.*

Warmack comes to the 95th CA Brigade from his previous assignment at the U.S. Special Operations Command, serving as the senior military representative to the U.S. Agency for International Development.

"To the Soldiers, civilians and families of the 95th, I cannot think of a more capable commander to lead you through the next chapter in the brigade's history," Irizzary said.

"Women and men of the 95th CA Brigade, it's an honor to serve with you," said Warmack. "What you have accomplished, and what you will accomplish, is strategic and vital within this nation and within this war. While your numbers are small, your contribution is disproportionately large. You are the warrior-diplomats for this special-operations forces team."

Warmack attended the University of Maryland and was commissioned as an Infantry officer in 1986. In that role, he has served with the 82nd Airborne Division, 1st Armored Division and 3rd Infantry Division. After attending Civil Affairs training in 1996, Warmack served in various positions in the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion, from team leader to commander of the battalion.

Warmack received a bachelor's in political science from the University of Maryland, a master's in international relations from Troy State University, a master's in national policy and strategic studies from the Naval War College, and a master's in national security and strategic resources from the Industrial College of the Armed Forces.

His awards and decorations include a Bronze Star Medal with Oak Leaf Cluster, Defense Meritorious Service Medal with Oak Leaf Cluster, Global War on Terror Expeditionary Medal, Iraq Campaign Medal, Kuwaiti Liberation Medal, Ranger Tab, Master Parachutist Badge, Combat Infantry Badge, Expert Infantry Badge and USAID Meritorious Honor Award.
— *USASOC PAO.*

SF Soldier earns Frederick Award

Sergeant 1st Class Sean Howie, 10th Special Forces Group, was awarded the 2008 First Special Service Force Frederick Award for his professional excellence and courage under fire during a deployment to Samarra, Iraq, in 2007.

The Special Forces medical sergeant conducted 215 consecutive days of continuous combat operations as the operations sergeant in an area deemed one of the most hostile in Iraq at the time.

The Frederick Award is presented by the First Special Service Force to a Special Forces operator who exhibits the highest degree of professionalism. The FSSF was a one-of-a-kind joint Canadian and American unit that fought side by side throughout the Italian Campaign and southern France during World War II. The award is named after Lieutenant Colonel Robert T. Frederick, the first commander of the FSSF.

"Sean Howie is like the vast majority of Green Berets in that they do not seek the spotlight," said Sergeant Major Gregory Hayes. "Sean just comes to work every day and tries to do his best. He loves what he does, and he takes enormous pride in his medical duties."

At any given time during his deployment, Howie could be found manning the .50-caliber machine gun in the turret of a tactical vehicle, leading assault elements, establishing casualty-collection points, treating patients in the compound clinic, supervising mass-casualty events, conducting tribal engagements and training Iraqi counterparts in close- quarters battle and combat-casualty care.

Howie, a 17-year veteran of Special Forces, said, "I've worked with top-notch guys my entire career. They strive to be the best. Danger is inherent with our jobs. You hope for the best and prepare for the worst."

His deployment had its share of danger. Howie and his team were returning from a mission when his vehicle was struck by an improvised explosive device. Exposed to the elements and sitting in the gunner's turret of the lead vehicle on the convoy, the medical sergeant took shrapnel to the face.

Samarra further tested his team's resilience and his medical expertise during four mass-casualty events involving IED attacks on the Iraqi Army and the Iraqi National Police. During his eight months, he made more than 200 medical contacts with coalition and Iraqi casualties.

With the attacks happening around them, Howie and his team were not immune to attacks during their missions. During an operation, his team came under intense enemy fire, and three members of the team were hit during the exchange. Being the only medic on

Howie

the team, he immediately assessed and called for a medical evacuation. While en route to the medical facility, Howie treated his wounded teammates, saving their lives.

During an attack on the Askariya Shrine, Howie and his team stepped into action without orders and were the first to arrive on scene. They secured the site and established a casualty-collection point, preventing a follow-on attack at the mosque. — *USASOC PAO.*

USASOC Soldier/NCO of the Year honored

The U.S. Army Special Operations Command announced the winners of its 2008 Noncommissioned Officer and Soldier of the Year competition in a ceremony July 17.

Sergeant 1st Class Steven J. Kroll, a Special Forces instructor from the 4th Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group, U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, was named the USASOC NCO of the Year.

Specialist Barrett E. Kauling, a radio and communications security technician from the 3rd Battalion, 75th

Kroll

Ranger Regiment, was selected as the USASOC Soldier of the Year.

Both will represent USASOC

Kauling

in the Department of the Army 2008 NCO and Soldier of the Year competition. — *USASOC PAO.*

Analytic Support to Intelligence in Counterinsurgencies

by Lieutenant Colonel Walter L. Perry, U.S. Army (ret.) and Lieutenant Colonel John Gordon IV, U.S. Army (ret.)

Insurgency is one of the oldest forms of conflict. Records of ancient regimes show how their rulers were frequently faced with revolts and insurrection. The reality that insurgency is a continual problem has persisted into the modern era. The United States Army spent decades conducting what was, essentially, a counterinsurgency in the American West during the period after the Civil War; the British Army was faced with multiple insurgencies during the period of empire in the 19th and early 20th centuries; and as the colonial era came to an end in the post-World War II period, the Western militaries — especially their armies — continued to face this challenge. Today, the problem of combating insurgencies continues to loom large for the armed forces of several Western nations.

Yet despite this, the preference of most Western militaries has been to focus on conventional combat operations against the armed forces of another nation-state. That focus is reflected in the spending patterns of the NATO nations today. Compared with the money devoted to new systems for high-intensity combat, the amount invested in the preparation for irregular warfare pales. Of course, quality does not equal quantity, and a strict resource metric does not necessarily gauge emphasis. However, when we couple the money spent with the relative ability of nations to conduct conventional and counterinsurgency operations, it is clear that the emphasis is on conventional forces.

What is the reality that faces Western militaries today? Iraq provides a useful example. Whereas the major-combat-operations phase in Iraq lasted some 23 days (from the time U.S. and UK forces crossed the border from Kuwait into Iraq to the last major battle in Baghdad on April 10, 2003) the counterinsurgency period has lasted more than 1,700 days as of this writing. This is consistent with the norm of post-World War II insurgencies.

Although Iraq and Afghanistan will probably reduce the appetite of Western nations to engage in similar events without vigorous domestic debate, a strong case can be made that the Western militaries simply cannot turn their back on the study of and preparation for counterinsurgency in a manner similar to the way the conventional U.S. military turned its back on the study of low-intensity operations in the aftermath of the unfortunate experience in Vietnam. A major part of enhancing our ability to conduct counterinsurgency is improving our ability to analyze how insurgencies get started, the different nature of each individual insurgency and the actions required by the security forces that are attempting to counter the movement.

This article examines the nature of the contemporary insurgent threat and provides insights on the need for better analysis of insurgency. It focuses on the security portion of a counterinsurgency effort. Other elements of counterinsurgency, such as efforts to improve governance in countries threatened by insurgency, are also critically important. However, those nonsecurity portions of counterinsurgency are beyond the scope of this analysis.

Nature of modern insurgency

Today, theorists and doctrine writers, those in charge of training and equipment purchases and the political leaders of the nations faced with insurgencies and other nations considering coming to their assistance must all consider the nature of modern insurgency. This is a profoundly important issue, since how nations view insurgencies will have significant influence on how their militaries and governments prepare for future counterinsurgency missions.

There is considerable discussion today about "what has changed." Does the modern, interconnected, networked, cable-television world obviate the lessons from past counterinsurgency campaigns? Or is the nature of insurgency so enduring as to render the recent phenomena of jihad just another chapter in what is a rather consistent story of how insurgencies develop and how they are countered? The reality is that there are important elements of truth in both views.

Whereas, in some respects, insur-

^ **WAR ZONE** Members of Karbala's Emergency Response Unit receive training from U.S. Special Forces on close-quarters battle tactics, urban movement and combat drills. The Soldiers are the quick-reaction force when dealing with insurgents. *U.S. Army photo.*

gencies have become slicker, quicker and enabled by modern information technology, many of the principles of counterinsurgency operations remain fundamentally the same. This reality should strongly influence how today's Western militaries prepare themselves for the challenge. In all of this, we see the need for sound analysis in order to determine what capabilities and what mixture of new and old techniques are most appropriate for a particular insurgency.

Most insurgencies evolve over time. While occasionally an insurgency suddenly springs forth in a matter of months (this is essentially what happened in Iraq), in most cases insurgencies gradually gather strength — assuming they survive their initial, weak, proto-insurgency phase. In this early phase, the most effective government counters to the insurgents are generally intelligence services and the police. There may be little, if any, role for the military at this point. If an insurgency survives past this initial stage, it can evolve into a small-scale insurgency. Now the insurgents start to make their presence felt with more open propagandizing and occasional attacks against government forces and facilities. While the police and intelligence agencies remain in the lead to combat the insurgents, at this point there may be a need to involve the military in the effort, since the police may need help in some areas.

Should the rebels continue to grow in numbers and capability, it could become a large-scale insurgency. At this point, major portions of the country could be under insurgent control, and a large portion of the population will have sided with the rebels. If the problem has reached such proportions, the insurgents stand a good chance of prevailing. On the government side, the military has by now probably taken the lead, since the insurgency is so strong that it is now beyond the ability of the police to control.

Intel dominance

Although there are some similarities, the role of intelligence in conventional combat operations differs considerably from its role in support of irregular warfare, including insurgencies. Because the enemy in an



Figure S.1

RAND *MG682-S.1*

insurgency is elusive, unknown and most likely indistinguishable from the general population, intelligence operations are crucial.

Support to conventional combat

In conventional combat operations, the intelligence mission is primarily to respond to the requirements imposed by the campaign plan — in essence, military intelligence. In this case, intelligence tends to support operations. Commanders decide what objectives they will seek to attain, and intelligence supports both the decision-making process and additional information needed to support the selected course of action.

Analysis in support of conventional operations is generally well-understood. For example, operational analysis can help commanders sift through the intelligence data by systematically applying systems-analysis techniques to the process of selecting the best course of action.

Support to counterinsurgency

Insurgent groups rarely resemble conventional-force formations until they have wrested control of large amounts of territory from the government. They are usually made up of clandestine groups operating in the shadow world, disrupting activities of the government in ways that resemble criminal gangs. Little, if anything, is generally known about their order of battle, equipment, strategic goals or tactics. In fact, their disruptive behavior can resemble the activities of ordinary criminals.

Successful intelligence operations in support of counterinsurgencies therefore resemble those of law-enforcement agencies. Operations against these insurgent cells must depend upon the development of intelligence aimed at identifying cell members and their location. Insurgent command structures are also likely to be unconventional, and much effort must be expended on understanding the relationships among the members of the various groups involved in the insurgency.

Insurgents generally conduct acts of violence against the established government. Assassinations, bombings, kidnappings and other forms of violence are common. Seemingly random acts against innocent civilians are conducted by insurgent gangs to intimidate and underscore the government's inability to protect the population. In investigating these incidents, considerable emphasis is placed on crime-scene analysis, social-network analysis, interrogation

of detainees, forensics and biometrics. Military intelligence begins to resemble police intelligence.

Analysis in support of these police-like operations is likely to be considerably different than analysis in support of conventional military operations. In supporting counterinsurgency operations, we need to apply existing, and perhaps new, analytic techniques to answer such questions as the following: Who are the insurgents? What are their objectives? Where will they strike next? How are they organized? Notice that answers to most of these questions are already known in conventional military operations. The law-enforcement community often employs pattern-analysis techniques, such as geographic profiling, to understand past criminal behavior and to predict where criminals are likely to strike next.

Analytic questions

Analysis in support of counterinsurgencies (indeed, in support of most unconventional wars) centers on contributing to intelligence production by focusing on required information elements. Because this is a unifying theme, we refer to analytic support in these cases as intelligence analysis. It is therefore important that we fully understand the anatomy of insurgent attacks. Figure S.1 depicts a typical sequence, from financing operations to conducting the attack. At each event in the chain, the insurgents are vulnerable to government detection and attack, but to varying degrees.

The analytic questions at each stage in an insurgency therefore center on understanding what is needed to interrupt insurgent attacks at each point in the event chain. Some of these questions are the following:

Signs of a nascent insurgency. What is the typical signature of a nascent insurgency — in terms of actions, pronouncements and so on?

Leadership and membership. Who are the leaders and principal deputies of each insurgent group? Where are they located? What is the relation among the group members and between groups?

Insurgent goals. Are the insurgents striving to overthrow the existing government or to gain autonomy for a region? How can the government take advantage of each goal?

The nature of insurgent attacks. Where are the weapons caches used by the insurgents? Where are the next attacks likely to occur? What is the nature of the attack "event chain"? What foreign entities (governments or groups) are assisting in the attacks in some way?

Intelligence sources. How can we best leverage information obtained from detainees? How can we use forensic and biometric evidence to locate insurgents?

Financing and recruitment. Who is financing the insurgency? How are the insurgent groups recruiting members? What part of the population is susceptible to recruitment? What are the inducements to join?

Weapons. What types of weapons are being used? Where do they come from? Where are they cached? Where are the assembly facilities for makeshift weapons? How are weapons delivered to attackers? Which groups are conducting the attacks?

Friendly-enemy interactions. What operational patterns are friendly forces exhibiting? How is this behavior being exploited by the enemy? How can a friendly force alter its behavior to make its patterns more difficult to discern? If its patterns are discerned, how can a friendly force make it more difficult for the enemy to exploit?

For the United States and other friendly nations to come to the aid of a neighbor threatened by insurgents, it is important to answer these questions. To do so, we turn to intelligence analysis, using some of the traditional tools of operational analysis and adding a few new tools.

In the process of applying these techniques, it is important to keep in mind two distinguishing characteristics of insurgencies: (1) When carrying out operations, insurgents are likely to subordinate global objectives to local objectives, and (2) Any attempts by the friendly forces to counter insurgent attacks are generally met with counters to the counters — that is, insurgents are adaptive.

Analysis

The analytic tools needed for answering the research questions will be a mix of existing methods of analysis, some new approaches and perhaps different ways of applying existing methods. We suggest several analytic techniques, based on our experience supporting operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Not all have proven successful, but in some cases that may be because they have not yet been applied.

All analysis depends on data, and analytic support to counterinsurgency operations is no exception. The major source of information on enemy activities is generally a report that records "significant" activities. A significant activity can be any incident deemed important. For example, locating a weapons cache is a significant activity, as is an enemy attack on a friendly convoy. In many cases, the most important pieces of information are recorded in narrative remarks sections — and not in the more structured data entries. Reports therefore are dependent upon the diligence of the individual Soldier preparing the entry. In addition, there

are other issues relevant to the usefulness of the data:

Data collection. Most data are collected to support operations — not to inform analysis.

Unevenness in reporting. Which incidents are considered "significant" can vary with the experience of the reporting unit.

Multiple databases. In Iraq, and to some degree, Afghanistan, the several databases are not linked or cross-referenced. Many are stored locally and not easily accessed.

Lack of a standard lexicon. A critical requirement for database searches is that the terms used be consistent. Unfortunately, only recently have standard definitions begun to be applied to data entries in Iraq.

Discerning patterns. Some of the research questions can be answered only in terms of what we refer to as indicators — that is, what friendly units should look for when searching for enemy activity. The methods most frequently used to develop indicators are pattern-classification methods, hierarchical decision trees and linear-discriminant analysis. All these methods examine factors associated with the occurrence of an event and then examine evidence in the form of training vectors to narrow the factors to a few strong indicators.

Predictive analyses. Predictive analyses aim at forecasting where (and sometimes when) the enemy will strike next. In the absence of data on friendly behavior, these techniques invariably depend upon statistical analysis of past insurgent behavior under the assumption that the past is prologue. The predictions therefore are based solely on what the enemy forces have done in the past — not on any interaction between friendly and enemy forces. Most predictions assume an underlying randomness associated with enemy behavior. Although several of these predictive methods exist, very few are currently being used in Iraq or Afghanistan. Local commanders therefore resort to heuristic methods that rely on the location and timing of past insurgent attacks plotted on maps. To be effective (and accepted by commanders in the field), predictive methods should (1) recognize that insurgent attacks are not random, (2) provide a mechanism for grouping historical events, (3) account for an adapting enemy, (4) benefit from input from local commands, (5) recognize that analysis is local, like the insurgency, and (6) be better than what the command is currently using.

Analyzing insurgent networks. Much of what commanders face across all phases of an insurgency consists of clandestine groups of loosely connected individuals carrying out criminal acts against the government and the friendly forces supporting it. In Iraq, commanders at all levels devote considerable time understanding the relationships among key people in the cities, towns and villages within their areas of operation. For insurgents to successfully carry out the activities depicted in Figure S.1, they must be in contact through some form of network. Understanding the structure of these networks is therefore a primary goal of counterinsurgency operations. A possible solution is the development of an intelligence-based common picture of the insurgent networks that (1) uses the most current intelligence estimates, (2) is automated so as to provide access to multiple commands, and (3) can be easily updated.

" Successful intelligence operations in support of counterinsurgencies therefore resemble those of law enforcement agencies. Operations against these insurgent cells must depend upon the development of intelligence aimed at identifying cell members and their location.

Friendly data generally not captured. Most of the data collected in Iraq and Afghanistan are associated with enemy activities — little information is recorded about friendly operations.

Sharing intelligence data among agencies. All too often, bureaucratic procedures inhibit or prohibit the sharing of information — much of which may be time-sensitive — between the organizations that are attempting to deal with the insurgency. Sharing intelligence information among allied nations is also difficult. This is particularly problematic for analysis.

Finally, there are techniques that appear to show some promise of being useful to intelligence analysis in support of counterinsurgencies:

Friendly-enemy interactions. In general, friendly forces are attacked because they are exposed in some way. In an insurgency, unlike conventional combat, there are no "lines of contact" behind which friendly forces are

secure. Typically, friendly forces create safe enclaves from which to mount operations. Once out of the enclave, friendly forces are exposed and therefore vulnerable to enemy attack. Because friendly forces cannot hide their activities, the enemy is free to attack — provided it has the resources and sufficient time to plan. There are two closely connected methods for examining the research question associated with friendly-enemy interactions: game theory and response detection.

Game theory approach. One advantage of using game theory is that the mental process involved in determining the payoffs forces us to assess enemy objectives: a favorable payoff to the enemy (Red) implies that it has achieved some part of its objectives.

In a counterinsurgency, friendly forces (Blue) make many decisions when planning and executing missions. They choose routes, times, travel speeds and so forth. The set of Blue strategies corresponds to the set of possible realizations of these choices.

Insurgent elements (Red) make their own decisions about attacking Blue. In general, the success of a Blue mission and the outcome of a Red attack depend on how well-matched Red's strategy is to Blue's strategy. Red must attack when and where Blue will travel, and it may need to adjust its tactics in a way that is tuned to the given Blue mission.

We assume that the outcome of the game for Red can be measured in terms of the expected payoff to be derived from the consequences of Red propaganda, friendly casualties, etc. Crucially, the analysis does not depend on actually measuring the payoffs. One approach is to examine relative payoffs. For example, Red may conclude that it has achieved its objective better with more Blue casualties than with fewer. The assumption is merely that the payoffs could be evaluated on some ordinal scale.

Response detection. A study currently being led by the Center for Naval Analyses examines a unit's historical movement patterns using archived Blue Force Tracker, or BFT, data.[1] This is generally a graphical process whereby BFT data are plotted on a map of the unit's area of operation — outside its forward operating base. This is repeated for a subsequent time period of equal length, and the difference is calculated.

In areas where significant change is observed, the analysis focuses on enemy activity to see how the enemy has exploited (responded to) the change in friendly behavior. Next, area density changes are computed within grids overlaid on the area of operations, and along road segments within those grids, if more resolution is needed.

An important aspect of this type of analysis is the development of suitable measures and metrics that reflect the level of Red-Blue interaction from one time period to the next. For the friendly forces, operational density is appropriate, i.e., the levels of Blue-force activity per unit area or per unit kilometer.

For Red, the metrics are simply the activity of interest for the analysis being conducted: the number of friendly-force casualties per time period, the number of attacks of specific types or all types per time period, the number of weapons caches found and cleared per time period, and so forth.

The goal of the response-detection analysis is to focus on areas where (1) a significant change in Blue-force activity has been observed, and (2) insurgents have either successfully taken advantage of the change or have failed to do so.

Conclusion

Our goal in this article has been to examine how operational analysis can be used to support the security portion of counterinsurgency operations. Insurgencies evolve over time. Normally starting as a small, clandestine movement of "true believers," insurgent movements are usually very weak and vulnerable in their early stages. If the movement survives and begins to grow, it can become a large-scale insurgency that has a reasonable chance of succeeding.

Our understanding of modern insurgency is evolving and improving. In some respects, the lessons and techniques used in past counterinsurgency efforts remain valid today. In other areas, important changes have taken place, especially in the ability of insurgents to use modern global information and communications networks to recruit, spread propaganda, organize and control their operations.

As analysts engaged in trying to understand and assess modern insurgencies, we must realize that this is a different form of conflict from what we grew accustomed to during the Cold War and the 1990s, when most of us focused on the interaction of conventional military forces. Instead of merely conducting operational analysis, we are really engaged in using operational-analysis techniques to support intelligence operations.

Notes:

[1] *The work presented here summarizes research conducted by Dr. Caryl Catarious, a research analyst at CNA.*

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Into Africa:

CA teams expand Operation Enduring Freedom into Chad

BY MAJOR DANFORD W. BRYANT II

During the six years of the war on terror, the most significant evolution has been the transition of operations from the direct to the indirect approach.

Many Americans are familiar with Operation Enduring Freedom-Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom, operations that have highlighted the direct approach of the Department of Defense and U.S. special-operations forces, or SOF. Fewer Americans are familiar with the details of Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines, and Operation Enduring Freedom-Trans Sahel, or OEF-TS, and their focus on the indirect approach.

This article will briefly examine recent operations in OEF-TS, specifically the experiences of one Civil Affairs team from Company F, 96th CA Battalion, 95th CA Brigade, to demonstrate the effectiveness of focused operations in civil-military engagement, or CME, in achieving indirect lines of operation in OEF-TS. It will also highlight some of the implications of the indirect approach for current and future operations.

Introduction

Between March 2007 and January 2008, elements of the 96th CA Battalion deployed to Africa in support of OEF-TS. CA teams supported the elements of the 10th Special Forces Group and Naval special-warfare units in a joint campaign. The campaign focused upon applying the indirect approach in order to achieve long-term positive influence and self-sustaining stability in the Sahel, the semi-arid, 2,400-mile belt that runs south of the Sahara.

During its deployment to Chad, one CA team from Company F, 96th CA Battalion, assumed duties as a civil-military support element, or CMSE, to support the U.S. Embassy and to extend the embassy country team's reach and effectiveness by, with and through partners and surrogates in order to build, replace, repair and sustain indigenous civil capabilities and capacities.

Command relationships

While deployed, Company F was under the operational control of the newly established Joint Special Operations Task Force-Trans Sahel, under Special Operations Command-Europe, or SOCEUR, which was the theater special-operations command responsible for campaign planning in OEF-TS. The company's CA teams were divided between the Army and Navy SOF ground components and, once in country, each team fell under the control of a special-operations command and control element, or SOCCE. The SOCCE acted as the "go-to man" for the U.S. ambassador and defense attaché, to whom they could address all issues related to SOF operations in-country.

The SOCCE in Chad had tactical control of the CA team, of a military information support team, and of a joint planning and analysis team, which lives with and trains daily with select members the host-nation military. Other SOF elements rotated through Chad, including Air Force and Marine SOF elements, and they too, were task-organized under the control of the Chad SOCCE.

For reporting purposes in Chad, each element was allowed to send reports to its parent organization after the country team, the SOCCE, and Navy SOF approved the release of the information. It is important to note that at *no time* was any report censored. Each report was read to make sure that no one in the chain of command would be surprised if questioned about any of the team's reports.

Establishing a foothold

Once the CA team established itself as part of the SOF team in Chad, it immediately began planning how it would support the defense attaché's humanitarian-assistance, or HA, program. In prior planning and coordination with SOCEUR, the CA company element of OEF-TS was delegated mission-planning authority for all HA.

The Navy SOF element in charge had developed a list of named areas of interest, or NAIs — geographic areas in which information that will satisfy a specific information requirement can be collected. Using the list of NAIs, the CA team developed a plan that would focus HA projects in those locations. The goal was to gain additional information and confirm or deny suspected indigenous civil vulnerabilities. Subsequent plans for projects and civil reconnaissance, or CR, were synchronized with the country mission strategic plan, the OEF-TS country and campaign plans, and ongoing activities of the U.S. Embassy and SOF.

CR and projects served as the access for developing relationships and gaining influence in areas that the CA team and the embassy deemed to be of operational or strategic interest. CR missions to assess potential activities, programs and projects allowed the CA team and other SOF elements to travel into areas where they lacked visibility and gave them an opportunity to assess the need for future actions that might achieve specific effects.

Areas of initial focus were under-governed areas in which violent extremists were suspected or known to have traveled, lived or recruited. The CR missions accomplished two objectives: They allowed identification

^ **IN COUNTRY** The Civil Affairs teams used air assets to get them into the region; however, once in country, they traveled to remote, under-governed areas. *Photo copyright C. Brian McCartney, used with permission.*

of, initial contact with, and establishment of rapport with key leaders and influencers, both formal and informal, in the focus areas. They also allowed the team to more fully map the physical and civil terrain in support of military and civil objectives of the U.S. Embassy and the host nation. The establishment and development of personal relationships during the interaction with the populace made the activities of the CA team indispensible to the embassy and its country team in achieving influence in these areas.

In each region, the CA team became the face of the United States and served as a representative of the U.S. government, specifically, the U.S. mission to Chad. The team leaders would not pass through key villages or cities without sitting down with the political and tribal leaders. The meetings could last minutes, hours or three to five days. In all engagements, the focus was not "What can we give you?," but on determining the underlying issues, grievances and problems within the civil component. With that determined, the team could then work toward developing the necessary capability and capacity solutions in coordination with indigenous partners and the embassy country team in order to shape and influence the civil environment and achieve the end state of self-sustainment, peace and stability.

Building Relationships

The two most important relationships established were those between the CA team and the key tribal and governmental leaders of the Lake Chad region and the Borkou-Ennedi-Tibesti, Chad's most northern region. In three missions to the Lake Chad region, conducted over a five-month period, the CA team sergeant became close with the governor of this critical prefecture (state) and also a friend of the Sultan of the Kanem. The governor, by virtue of his political position, was a formal influencer. He also possessed significant "real" power and respect among the regional population. In addition, the sultan was determined to be a significant power broker formally as a tribal leader and informally through his associations with the political hierarchy of Chad. The team soon learned that the sultan was considered to be the second most

^ **CLINICAL TRIALS** Civil Affairs teams were given unprecedented access to facilities in Chad. That access was won by the development of relationships with local leaders in the region. *Photo copyright C. Brian McCartney, used with permission.*

powerful man in Chad, second only to Chad's President Deby.

Another important part of building relationships with these and other key players, spheres of influence and centers of gravity was that the relationships gave the CA team legitimacy with local and regional populations. That legitimacy opened doors in otherwise closed areas and gave the Chadians confidence to report their concerns about economic, security and political issues. They opened the doors to their hospitals, clinics, schools, power facilities, sewage facilities, radio stations and any other location the CA team wished to assess. It cannot be stressed enough how important it is to establish strong relationships with the key players. Collecting information, performing CR and analyzing the information obtained is critical to determining who these key players are and what the basis of their power and influence is.

Accomplishments

During their time in country, the CA team conducted numerous CR operations to the southern border with the Central African Republic, the eastern border with Sudan (Darfur region), the Lake Chad region, the central regions, and the northernmost regions that border Sudan, Libya, Niger and Nigeria.

The information gathered during these CR missions assisted the CA team, the U.S. Embassy, the SOCCE and other SOF elements with targeting-development programs for specific nonlethal effects. The information gleaned during these CR missions formed the basis for a much greater understanding of the "human terrain" of Chad for the CA team, the U.S. Embassy and SOCEUR. That understanding, in the long term, facilitates a better long-term solution to the country-specific challenges of winning the war on terrorism.

Of the various missions conducted by the CA team, the most important was a joint SOF CR mission in northern Chad, conducted in conjunction with the U.S. Embassy and special-operations forces of the Navy and Air Force. The mission allowed the CA team to enter areas of Chad in which few U.S. military or government elements had ever traveled.

In addition to performing coordination and synchronization with U.S. military and civilian agencies, the CA team also met with the leaders of the French garrison in Chad.

^ **WATER WOES** The Civil Affairs team found that rather than wanting schools built or wells dug, the villagers were more interested in restoring the gardens around the oasis. The gardens and the oasis were destroyed during a period of political unrest. *Photo copyright C. Brian McCartney, used with permission.*

Coordination with the French was not required, but it was done in the interest of "understanding the human terrain." The French are an influential element in Chad, having maintained a presence there since the early 1900s.

In this situation, the CA team, in conjunction with the U.S. Embassy, determined that not to meet with the French would have been a breach of protocol and an impediment to mobility. Informing the leaders of the French garrison, in general terms, of what the team was doing and where it would be traveling paid great dividends. In fact, the French made it clear that if the CA team had any difficulties or needed medevac assistance, they would gladly help.

The joint CR mission in northern Chad provided the U.S. Embassy with access to, contacts in and information about Chad's most under-governed regions. The CA team succeeded in opening doors for follow-on activities by a Navy SOF element that needed to plan future joint and combined exercises for training with host-nation military forces in the north.

It is important to note that the Department of State participated by sending a representative who assisted with protocol issues in that sensitive region. The DoS representative was present only on the days of insertion and extraction for meetings with the regional governor and leaders, but his presence reinforced the significance of interagency synchronization and coordination for all operations. In the CME environment, synchronization and coordination are critical to ensure that SOF operations are nested with the U.S. government's foreign-policy objectives for the region.

Conclusion

An 11- month mission to a country as austere as Chad is never easy. As a "proof of concept" for CME, specifically for the deployment of civil-military support elements, or CMSEs, the CA team's accomplishments during the deployment raised the bar for nonlethal operations in support of U.S. SOF's objectives in the war on terror in Africa. Some of the CA team's accomplishments were:

- Provided proof of concept for the CMSE mission.

- Conducted numerous CR missions; gained significant human-terrain information for both SOF and the

^ **BUSINESS DISTRICT** Villagers visit the market in this rural area of Chad. *Photo copyright C. Brian McCartney, used with permission.*

U.S. Embassy's country team.

- Established relationships with centers of gravity in operationally and strategically critical regions.

- Performed 31 precisely focused and effective projects valued at approximately $400,000 (FY 2007); all linked and/or nested with the country team's mission strategic plan and the specified effects of Joint Special Operations Task Force-Trans-Sahel.

The CMSE proved to be an effective way of tailoring a CA team to a specific mission, country and embassy. The length of the mission and the unique nature of the deployment and operations yielded numerous lessons learned. During the relief in place with follow-on CA forces, the outgoing and follow-on teams discussed the lessons learned in detail so that the follow-on team could benefit from the CA team's experience. Some of the more significant lessons learned were:

1) A CA team *must* be flexible, competent and open to working with all indigenous, SOF and interagency elements available. For the CMSE mission, CA is not just another "slice" element sent to support the "operators": CA forces are more often than not the main effort for realization of long-term nonlethal effects implied and specified in a campaign or operation's indirect lines of operation.

2) Because CA Soldiers conducting CME missions must be comfortable operating with a small team in foreign and austere environments and with little or no supervision or guidance, they should go through a physical and psychological assessment similar to that of other Soldiers currently being assessed and selected for Army SOF. Currently, there is no

^ **ROAD TRIP** The Civil Affairs team operated on its own in very remote areas of Chad. They were often days away from any other forces or support. *Photo copyright C. Brian McCartney, used with permission.*

physical and psychological assessment process for the accession of active-component CA Soldiers. These are the Soldiers who will be expected to conduct CME missions.

3) CA personnel must go into CMSE missions with a proactive, self-supporting mindset and an expectation that they will be alone and conducting reconnaissance where no one else has gone. CA is used to working by, with and through the U.S. Agency for International Development, host-nation organizations, nongovernment organizations and others. But, as has been evidenced in Chad, a team must be ready to strike out on its own when no other organizations are present in its region.

4) Pre-mission training must include realistic scenarios that reinforce basic CA skills, as well as advanced training in negotiations, off-road navigation and off-road driving of nontactical four-wheel-drive vehicles.

5) Access to deminimus funding would allow CA teams quick access to cash or reimbursements and would greatly improve the effectiveness of our CA elements. There is no better way to gain immediate legitimacy with an important individual or community than being able to solve an important issue on the spot. **SW**

Major Dan Bryant has served at company, battalion and brigade level and is currently a company commander within the 91st Civil Affairs Battalion. His operational experience includes Desert Storm, Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom - Trans-Sahel.

Naval Postgraduate School:

Training special operations personnel for certainty; educating for uncertainty

by Colonel Brian Greenshields and Peter Gustaitis

Since its inception in 1992, the Special Operations Master's Degree Program, or SOMDP, has trained more than 550 officers to fill key staff and leadership positions in the Department of Defense. While the curriculum has evolved over time, the program's mission to develop critical thinkers and capable operators, planners and commanders has steadfastly adhered to General Peter Schoomaker's admonition, "Train for certainty; educate for uncertainty."

SOMDP, taught at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, Calif., began when a group of 13 Navy SEALs doing their graduate work at NPS saw the need for a curriculum that would focus on the "unconventional" problems encountered by personnel assigned to the U.S. Special Operations Command, or USSOCOM.

Under the guidance of Dr. Gordon McCormick, a visiting professor from the RAND Corporation, NPS built a course of instruction around operational and strategic issues and the use of special-operations forces. The proposed course of instruction was so well-received by the students, including Commander Bill McRaven, now commander of the Joint Special Operations Command, that the NPS superintendent arranged for the curriculum to be briefed to the commander of the Naval Special Warfare Command, who immediately decided to sponsor the unique program.

Over the years, SOMDP has undergone many changes. In 1994, sponsorship of the program switched to USSOCOM to reflect the growing demand of the joint curriculum. In 1995, the special-operations curriculum added two senior service school-equivalent fellowships. In 2001, it became its own academic department, the Department of Defense Analysis.

In 2003, it began receiving students from the International Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program. In 2004, it was designated a developmental course for Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations officers. Today, the program hosts more than 140 joint SOF, conventional and international officers each year, and students are awarded a master of science degree in defense analysis upon completion of the program.

SOMDP is the only education program in DoD in which 100 percent of the instruction is dedicated, directly or indirectly, to the study of irregular warfare, or IW. In fact, the Joint Staff has recognized SOMDP as a "center of gravity" in the education of IW strategists and campaign planners, and USSOCOM has named NPS as a top-tier school in its plan to build its own IW expertise, as mandated by the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review and the subsequent IW Roadmap.

The 18-month program comprises 21 courses, a thesis requirement, mandatory attendance at numerous symposia and roundtables, and a robust series of guest speakers. The SOMDP curriculum revolves around a core set of courses that all students are required to take. After the second quarter, each student picks a major track that entails a host of specialty courses. Examples of these tracks include: IW, terrorist operations and financing, regional area studies, information operations, stabilization and reconstruction, and operations research.

Examples of the courses offered include seminars on guerrilla warfare, warfare in the information age, the anthropology of conflict, culture and influence, the rise of religious violence, the history of special operations, jihadi information strategy, psychological operations and public diplomacy, models for military decision-making, critical thinking and ethical decision-making. Students also have the opportunity to attend courses at the Monterey Institute of International Students and to attend language-maintenance courses with the aid of instructors from the nearby Defense Language Institute.

Besides the unique curriculum, SOMDP stands out for many other reasons. One of these is the high-quality and interdisciplinary nature of the Defense Analysis Department's faculty. The faculty comprises political scientists, historians, anthropologists, social scientists, mathematicians, computer scientists and even a published poet. Its members have Ph.D.s from institutions such as Stanford, Johns Hopkins, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Berkeley, to name only a few. A number of them

are retired or prior military with special-operations experience.

Another reason why the SOMDP stands out from other programs is that funding provided by USSOCOM allows students to travel in support of their thesis research. Finally, in addition to the robust academic program, SOMDP gives students the opportunity to engage in activities that support the SOF community at large. In the past, SOMDP students have played key roles in efforts such as the Iraq Study Group, development of the IW joint-operations concept, special seminars for the Office of Net Assessment, mobile training teams from the Joint Special Operations University, and several projects sponsored by the geographic combatant commands.

In July, the Army deputy chief of staff G3/5/7 granted full ILE/JPME 1/MEL 4 credit for Army SF, CA and PSYOP officers attending the SOMDP, provided that they complete four PME courses offered at the Naval War College's Monterey satellite campus, conveniently located at NPS, and that they attend the two-week ILE Prep Course prior to reporting to NPS. DA is considering a request to grant the same credit to Rangers, special-operations aviators and special-management officers. In addition, the U.S. Army Special Operations Command has recently increased its yearly quota of NPS students from 40 to 50.

Until this year, selection of Army officers to attend SOMDP was performed by an Army board internal to the ARSOF Group at the U.S. Army Human Resources Command. In January, the director of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School's Directorate of Special Operations Proponency was added to the selection board. The board meets annually in January to consider the applications of officers in Special Forces, Psychological Operations, Civil Affairs, Ranger units, special-operations aviation and special-management units for SOMDP's July and January starts.

The January 2009 board will select officers to begin SOMDP in July 2009 and January 2010. The board's target group will be branch-qualified captains in year group 1998. Officers in YG 1999 may also apply, but priority will be given to senior year groups. Applications consist of a DA 1618 signed and endorsed by the applicant's battalion commander, certified college transcripts, a current officer record brief and a current official photo. NPS has waived the requirement for officers to take the Graduate Record Examination. Officers should contact their branch representative for further information.

The quality that makes SOF special, according to Admiral Eric Olson, the commander of USSOCOM, is their wisdom. That wisdom is the product of experience and education. Melding the concepts, theories and models taught at NPS with the unmatched combat experience of today's SOF officers will produce leaders who are well-prepared to operate in the uncertain global environment of the future. **SW**

Colonel Brian Greenshields is the chair of special operations, Defense Analysis Department, at the Naval Postgraduate School.

Colonel Peter Gustaitis, U.S. Army (ret.) is a senior lecturer in the Defense Analysis Department at the Naval Postgraduate School.

Enlisted

Selection board set

The Fiscal Year 2009 Sergeant First Class Selection Board will convene in February 2009. With the continuing increased OPTEMPO, Soldiers should keep their Official Military Personnel Folder, DA photo and Enlisted Record Brief updated as part of a continuous process.

Finding the time to take care of personnel records while not deployed will pay dividends by ensuring that the file the selection board sees paints a full and accurate picture of the candidate as a Special Forces NCO.

For more information on the current selection board schedule, visit the HRC Enlisted Selections and Promotions home page at https://www.hrc.army.mil/site/Active/select/Enlisted.htm.

For additional information, telephone SGM J.C. Crenshaw at DSN 239-7594 or commercial (910) 432-7594, or send e-mail to john.crenshaw1@us.army.mil.

CMF 18 poised to support growth of SF groups

The strength of CMF 18 is at an all-time high because of the unprecedented growth the force has experienced in the last two years.

The production of new Special Forces Qualification Course graduates from the JFK Special Warfare Center and School and the high retention rates of the NCOs in CMF 18 will keep the force healthy and increase positions at the Special Forces company and higher levels in Fiscal Year 2009.

The addition of one battalion to every Special Forces Group, starting with 4th Battalion, 5th Special Forces Group, in FY 2008 and continuing with 4th Battalion, 3rd Special Forces Group, in FY 2009 is well under way, and force numbers are expected to support adding one battalion per group per year through FY 2012.

Special Forces selected for pilot of Army Career Tracker

CMF 18 has been designated as one of two CMFs to pilot the new Army Career Tracker, or ACT. ACT will allow Soldiers to gather information about career choices available to them and to map out goals for their careers. Leaders will be able to use the ACT as a counseling tool to inform and develop their subordinates with counseling and interaction on opportunities, key decisions and requirements for career progression. ACT will give Soldiers access to their administrative and training history and accomplishments via the professional-development module.

The system pilot, in development, is now scheduled to begin in 2009 with selected individuals from Fort Bragg, N.C. Full implementation of ACT, previously scheduled for 2009, has been postponed until a date to be determined.

Warrant Officer

SF warrant officer recruiting mission approved

The recruiting mission for Special Forces warrant officer, MOS 180A, has been approved for FY 2009. The mission is determined each year for subsequent fiscal years through an analytical process that considers all impacts on the force, both current and projected. The FY 2009 recruiting mission is 70 active-duty accessions and 20 National Guard WO accessions, to meet planned force growth requirements.

Instructors needed for SF Warrant Officer Institute

The newly formed Warrant Officer Institute is looking for qualified SF warrant officers to serve as instructors at both the Warrant Officer Technical and Tactical Certification Course, or WOTTC, and the Warrant Officer Advanced Course, or WOAC.

To become a WOTTC instructor, at a minimum, a Soldier must be a CW 3, SF WOAC graduate and have operational experience within the previous six months. Highly qualified applicants will also have 60 semester/quarter hours or more of college, ASO III and have a Force Protection Level II certification.

In order to meet the minimum qualifications to become an instructor at the WOAC a Soldier must be a CW 4, a graduate of the Warrant Officer Staff Course, have operational experience within the previous six months and have experience as a member of an SF battalion staff. Highly qualified applicants will also have 60 semester/quarter hours or more of college, ASO III and Force Protection Level II certification.

Soldiers in 180A seeking a challenging and rewarding position as either a WOTTC or WOAC instructor and who meet the minimum qualifications should contact their group senior warrant officer and CWO 4(P) Tony Fox, HRC 180A assignment manager, to request assignment as an SF Warrant Officer Institute instructor. CWO 4 Fox can be reached by calling commercial (703) 325-5231 or DSN 221-5231, or via e-mail at tony.l.fox@conus.army.mil or tony.l.fox@us.army.mil .

Warrant officer accession board scheduled

The U.S. Army Recruiting Command will conduct three active-duty warrant officer accession-selection boards for potential 180As in FY 2009. Accession-selection board dates are Nov. 17 - 21, Jan. 12-16, 2009, and July 13-17, 2009. For more information, interested SF NCOs should visit the USAREC home page at www.usarec.army.mil/hq/warrantofficer/warrant.html, or telephone DSN 239-7597/1879.

National Guard seeking SF warrant officer candidates

Army National Guard recruiting efforts remain high for SF warrant officers. If you are a CMF 18 NCO in the ARNG and are ready to take on a challenging and rewarding career as a SF warrant officer, contact your state CCWO or the 180A proponent manager at the Special Warfare Center and School to see if you meet the prerequisites. The 180A Proponent Manager can be reached at commercial (910) 432-1879/7597 or DSN 239-1879/7597.

Officer

Training team commands are now key developmental positions

Currently, there are more than 2,000 officers serving on transition teams advising, training and supporting the Iraqi and Afghan security forces.

To ensure that the best possible officers are selected to serve on these teams, the Chief of Staff of the Army has designated the captain and major positions on these teams as key developmental positions, thus placing those positions on par with company commands, S3 and executive-officer positions in other units.

Additionally, there are 38 positions for lieutenant colonels who have been designated to receive battalion-command credit. These positions are the team-chief positions on teams that are directly aligned with brigade-sized Iraqi and Afghan units of the army, police and border guards. The team chief is responsible for the training, employment and support of an Iraqi or Afghan brigade directly involved in combat operations.

The selection of these 38 officers will be a competitive process. Officers who are selected for transition-team positions will receive credit for 16 months of battalion command as a DA centrally selected commander in the operations category. These positions will be open to all eligible officers in the maneuver, fires and effects, or MFE, branches, including Special Forces, Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs.

For the training team commands that are available in 2009, each branch within MFE will be allocated a number of commands based on the size of the population. HRC will activate officers off the most recent CSL alternate list. ARSOF branch does not know yet how many commands it will receive.

For the training team commands that are available in 2010, there will be a new command category established.The category will be called "combat-arms operations," and it will be open to all eligible officers in MFE branches (including PSYOP and CA), and foreign-area officers, who wish to compete. With the command-preference designation window open, officers have the option to compete in the new category as well as in the traditional categories (PO and CA operations, garrison, recruiting, etc.). The board will select the 38 best officers from across the MFE branches.

SF, PSYOP and CA operations and combat-arms operations will be linked, so that an officer who competes in one category will automatically compete in the other, which means that they will automatically compete for a transition-team command position.

If an officer does not want to command a transition team, he will be giving up his opportunity to command an ARSOF battalion. The garrison, recruiting and strategic-support categories remain independent choices, and an officer may choose to compete in each category individually.

ILE credit available for NPS

On July 13, the Department of Army G3/5/7, Lieutenant General James D. Thurman, approved the granting of credit for intermediate level education, or ILE, to Army officers who attend the Naval Postgraduate School, or NPS. To receive ILE credit, an officer must attend a two-week preparatory course en route to NPS, complete four Navy command and staff distance-education courses while at NPS, and complete the graduate-studies program at NPS within 18 months.

ARSOF has up to 50 new start allocations for NPS beginning in fiscal year 2009. The next NPS selection board will be held in January 2009. For information, visit the ARSOF branches site on the Human Resources Command Web site.

WE WANT TO HEAR FROM YOU...

The Special Warfare staff needs your help to make this the best publication it can be. Drop us a line and let us know your ideas and opinions about the concept and design of the magazine.

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- Are the articles addressing issues that are pertinent to the force?
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- Just tell us what's on your mind.

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Include your full name, rank, address and phone number with all submissions. Articles dealing with a specific operation should be reviewed for security through the author's chain of command.

THE SAINTS

THE RHODESIAN LIGHT INFANTRY



DETAILS

By Alexandre Binda and Chris Cocks
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Reviewed by:
Lieutenant Colonel Peter J. Benson
U.S. Army Special Forces Command

"Their Army cannot be defeated in the field, either by terrorists or even a more sophisticated enemy. In my professional judgment, based on more than 20 years' experience ... of counterinsurgency and guerrilla-type operations, there is no doubt that Rhodesia now has the most professional and battle worthy army in the world today for this particular type of warfare."

Former NATO commander Sir Walter Walker's quote in the London *Times* from Alexandre Binda's *The Saints* speaks volumes to the quality of the Rhodesian Army in the "Bush War." The Rhodesian Bush War, which lasted from 1965 to 1980, pitted Rhodesia's minority-rule government and its security forces against several numerically superior, externally-based and internationally-supported communist insurgent forces. Ignored by the contemporary international community and all but forgotten by professional historians and students of counterinsurgency, the Bush War is a fascinating period in the study of modern counterinsurgency.

Declaring independence unilaterally from Britain in 1965, Rhodesia was soon after embroiled in a growing conflict with a communist based insurgency. Vilified and embargoed internationally for its independent stance and its minority-rule government, Rhodesia nonetheless fought with tenacity, endurance and innovation, all the while outnumbered by its insurgent enemies.

Despite crippling international economic sanctions and materiel embargoes, the Rhodesian military developed and validated new tactics, techniques and equipment to effectively battle the growing insurgency. Starting with the lessons of other Commonwealth counterinsurgency wars, such as Malaya and the Mau Mau rebellion, the Rhodesian security forces rapidly inculcated lessons learned in the field. The Rhodesian joint combined arms approach to the insurgent battle was to prove devastatingly effective — during the Bush War, the Rhodesian Army remained undefeated in combat.

No unit fought more valiantly in this struggle than the 1st Battalion, Rhodesian Light Infantry Regiment, or RLI. Perhaps less well-known than the Rhodesian Special Air Service Regiment, or Selous Scouts, the RLI was one of the most effective counterinsurgency units of the Rhodesian military. *The Saints* is a tremendous contribution to the history of this conflict, filling a gap in the record of the Bush War. The history of the 1st Battalion, RLI is one of courage, adaptability and combat effectiveness throughout the conflict. Initially, the battalion was formed as a standard light-infantry formation, but the progression of the insurgency war prompted it to reorganize to a "commando" role and to adopt new tactics.

The development and fielding of "fireforce" elements was a sentinel development in the Bush War tactics. These air- and heliborne quick-reaction forces, backed by ground reinforcement, were highly mobile and aggressive squad- and platoon-sized rapid-reaction elements. Deployed in reaction to terrorist sightings or to track terrorist "spoor" when found, the fireforces were often called

out two or three times daily. Relentlessly pursuing the enemy with trackers, these aggressive forces, backed by helicopter gunships and close air support, found, fixed and eliminated the enemy. The fireforces were a key feature of the Bush War.

The 1st Battalion, RLI became central to the deployment of the fireforces. These potent combat elements were based at intermediate staging bases throughout Rhodesia, where they were controlled and employed by joint sub-headquarters and the joint operations centers, or JOCS.

The JOCs had operational control over all security forces within the district. When actionable intelligence, such as terrorist sightings or fresh tracks, was reported, the fireforce was called in. The immediate employment of these combat forces on near-real-time intelligence-driven missions was key to the success of the Rhodesian security forces.

Terrorist forces were rapidly surrounded by ground forces or through vertical envelopment, or they were pursued until contact was made. The fireforce's rapid employment produced an incredible number of enemy contacts, with the superiorly trained RLI troopers emerging victorious time and again. During the war, the 1st Battalion, RLI, is credited with killing an estimated 12,000 to 15,000 enemy guerrillas, while losing only 135 of its own men.

Binda has created an incredible record of the RLI in *The Saints*. The book is a large-format edition and is organized chronologically to follow the development of the 1st Battalion of the RLI from its inception in 1961 through its disbanding in 1980.

The book is not strictly a comprehensive history of the RLI but is a compilation of individual troopers' narratives that weave the story of the battalion. The individual sections are divided up into years or groups of years, based on the development of the battalion or its operations. Beginning in 1961 with the formation of the unit, the book tracks the training of the battalion, including its transformation into a commando unit in 1965. The prelude to the Bush War begins in with the first "contacts" with the communist insurgents in 1966. Operations Nickel in 1967 and Cauldron in 1968 heralded the maturation of the battalion as a dedicated counterinsurgency force.

In 1973, the fireforce mission became part of the RLI's core employment tactics. In 1977, the 1st Battalion began to take part in "external operations" in partnership with the SAS or Selous Scouts. Several of these high profile, large-scale, direct-action, cross-border raids on insurgent bases in Mozambique and Zambia were conducted during the Bush War with extraordinary results.

The unit cohesion and impressive combat power projected by this one battalion during the Bush War is evident throughout the book. The unit continued to refine and develop its structure, staffing, weaponry and tactics throughout the Bush War. It was able to deploy via ground vehicle, helicopter or parachute in varying roles, both internally or for cross-border strikes into neighboring countries.

One of the greatest strengths of *The Saints* is the use of personal narratives of members of the 1st Battalion, RLI that make up the book. Supported by descriptions of the development of the unit, the narrative of the soldiers themselves tells the story of the unit, its training and combat operations. These give the text a "gritty" feeling of the "troop's eye view" of the RLI's history. Rather than sounding like an analytical history of the battalion, the real, "on the ground" history of the unit in the counterinsurgency war comes though.

The Bush War was, in essence, a campaign of small-unit actions. It was fought by the RLI in section- and troop-sized elements led by junior leaders. By telling the story of the 1st Battalion using the troop's own words, *The Saints* has a personal and realistic texture. Accompanied by a fantastic array of personal contemporary photographs, most never before published, this book becomes a vivid testament to the fitting pride and outstanding valor of this fighting unit.

If you are interested in writing a book review, please e-mail steelman@soc.mil for books or criteria.

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